Abstract. This paper deals with the min-max and min-min Stackelberg strategies in the case of a closed-loop information structure. Two-player differential one-single stage games are considered with one leader and one follower. We first derive necessary conditions for the existence of the follower to characterize the best response set of the follower and to recast it, under weak assumptions, to an equivalent and more convenient form for expressing the constraints of the leader's optimization problem. Under a standard strict Legendre condition, we then derive optimality necessary conditions for the leader of both min-max and min-min Stackelberg strategies in the general case of nonlinear criteria for finite time horizon games. This leads to an expression of the optimal controls along the associated trajectory. Then, using focal point theory, the necessary conditions are also shown to be sufficient and lead to cheap control. The set of initial states allowing the existence of an optimal trajectory is emphasized. The linear-quadratic case is detailed to illustrate these results.
Introduction
A Stackelberg game, named after Heinrich von Stackelberg in recognition of his pioneering work on static games [56] , designates a two-player noncooperative decision making problem formalized as a hierarchical combination of two optimization problems. The lower level decision maker, called the follower, selects a strategy optimizing his/her own objective function, depending on the strategy of the upper level decision maker, called the leader. The leader may decide his/her strategy, optimizing his/her objective function, relative to the decisions of both players by knowing the rational reaction of the follower. Such a problem may be viewed as a particular bilevel optimization problem [26, 55, 58] . When the rational reaction set of the follower is not reduced to a singleton, the situation is more complex and several formulations exist and have been introduced by Leitmann [36] (see also [4] ) and called weak and strong Stackelberg strategies by Breton et al. [17] or pessimistic and optimistic ones in [26, 27] . The term strong reflects the fact that the leader and the follower are seeking to minimize the criterion of the leader. Such a strategy leads to several motivating properties. In particular, it is stable to perturbations and could thus be called a Stackelberg equilibrium and in addition the resulting criterion of the leader will be equal or better than the one obtained via a Nash solution. The term weak is applied to Stackelberg strategies for which the latter two properties do not hold anymore. Nonetheless they are interesting and adapted to model performance guarantees (or for instance, robustness in control theory), without assuming additionally that the follower, after having minimized his/her own criterion, tries to maximize the criterion of the leader as proposed in [36] . The strong and weak Stackelberg strategies will be referred to respectively as the min-min and min-max ones in the whole paper. The class of strong-weak Stackelberg strategies, introduced in [3] generalizes and gathers together strong and weak ones. Their computational aspects in static games have been studied in [38, 39] .
Game theory being a generic multi-objective optimization framework, the field of applications of Stackelberg strategies is large and includes, for example, economy [9] , social behaviors, marketing [31] , advertising in licensing contracts [18] , network communications [14, 34] , military intelligence [45] . The Stackelberg strategy for differential games was introduced in [21, 47, 48] . We consider here two-player nonzero sum differential games with one leader and one follower.
The information structure [12] in the game is the set of all available information for the players to make their decisions. The methods used to tackle such a Stackelberg optimization problem depend on the specific information structure.
When open-loop information structure is considered, no measurement of the state of the system is available and the players are committed to follow a predetermined strategy based on their knowledge of the initial state, the system's model and the cost functional to be minimized. Necessary conditions for obtaining a Stackelberg strategy with an open-loop information structure are well known [1, 29, 33, 42, [47] [48] [49] [50] 57] and are derived from the standard Pontryagin minimum principle [35] . The obtained controls in this case are only functions of time.
The Stackelberg strategy is known to be inconsistent in time [25, 28] , and dynamic programming cannot help to derive the optimal controls. Note however that the concept of feedback Stackelberg control, not considered in the present paper, is defined as the limit of controls obtained by dynamic programming on infinitesimally small time subintervals (see [10, 12, 32, 40, 43, 44] ), that is in a multistage framework of repeated games. This concept differs from the concept of closed-loop control under consideration in this paper.
For the closed-loop information structure case (or, more precisely, the memoryless closed-loop information structure), each player has access to current state measurements and thus can adapt his strategy to the evolution of the system. For the closed-loop information structure case, determining the Stackelberg strategy for differential games is much harder than the other information structures and has been an open problem for a long time. The main difficulty comes from the presence, in the expression of the rational reaction set of the follower, of the partial derivative of the leader's control with respect to the measurement of the state. Several attempts have been proposed in the literature to overcome this difficulty [12] . Among such techniques, two main approaches could be distinguished.
The first method is dedicated to min-min Stackelberg strategies with a team-optimal approach introduced in [11, 13] . At the first step, the leader and the follower are aiming at optimizing the leader criterion as a team. Under some weak assumptions for linear-quadratic games [52] , the optimal value of the leader criterion is attained for a parametrized family of controls for the leader and the follower. At the second step, the parameters of both controls are chosen such that the control of the follower lies in the rational reaction set in response to the control of the leader [51] . This could be interpreted as a threat formulated by the leader towards the follower [52] , that is the leader punishes the follower, if he/she does not comply with the leader's policy, like (grim-) trigger for repeated games [8, 30] .
The second approach consists in defining the whole rational reaction set of the follower for a given control of the leader. The resulting optimal control problem turns out to be nonclassical, not solvable a priori with the usual Pontryagin minimum principle. To solve this kind of nonclassical problem, a variational method is proposed in [46] , assuming that this is a normal optimization problem (the possible occurence of an abnormal case is not mentioned). Moreover, in [41] it is emphasized that this technique does not lead to a solution for all initial states, and the difficulty is bypassed by assuming that the initial state of the system is uniformly distributed over the unit sphere and replacing the optimization criterion with its mean value over the initial state.
In this paper, we investigate both min-max and min-min Stackelberg strategies with closed-loop information structure. The best response set of the follower is characterized. This allows a convenient reformulation of the constraints of the leader's optimization problem under an assumption that is weaker than considering the best response set reduced to a singleton. Nevertheless it is shown that under a standard strict Legendre condition, it is possible to solve both min-max and min-min Stackelberg strategies. Note that min-max and min-min Stackelberg strategies coincide whenever the best response set is reduced to a singleton, and this happens in the important linear-quadratic case. The optimality necessary conditions for the leader are obtained, for both min-max and min-min Stackelberg strategies, along the associated trajectory, in the same spirit as in [46] for min-min Stackelberg strategy and by considering all cases. In addition, sufficient conditions of the optimization problem for linear-quadratic differential games are established using focal times theory. Based on these necessary and/or sufficient conditions, we then characterize all initial states from which there emanates an optimal trajectory. Also, an extension is proposed to associate with every initial state an optimal trajectory by introducing the Jacobian of the leader's control in his own criterion. Note that in [46] , although the final result (for linear-quadratic games only) is correct, some of the arguments thereof used to derive the necessary conditions are either erroneous or missing.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Sec. 2, the min-max and min-min Stackelberg strategies are mathematically formulated. Section 3 gathers the necessary conditions of existence for a strategy for the follower (Sec. 3.1) and for the leader (Sec. 3.2) for min-max and min-min Stackelberg strategies. A degeneration property of the Stackelberg strategy is emphasized in Sec. 3.3. These necessary conditions are detailed in the case of linear-quadratic twoplayer differential games in Sec. 3.4. The sufficient conditions are provided for the linear-quadratic case in Sec. 4. All these results lead to the two main results of this paper Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 4.1, which ensure the existence of optimal trajectories. Concluding remarks make up Sec. 5. The main proofs are gathered in Appendix A.
Preliminaries: Stackelberg strategy
A two-player differential game with finite horizon comprises
• a set of two players K = {1, 2}, where Player 1 is called the leader and Player 2 the follower;
representing the action sets (or control sets) respectively of the leader and the follower (they will be specified below); • a mapping f : T × X × U × V → X of class C 1 defining the evolution law of the state aṡ
where u |t and v |t are the values at time t of the controls of both players u ∈ U and v ∈ V;
• utility functions or criteria J i : U × V → R of Player i ∈ K, defined as
2)
The functions L 1 and L 2 are C 1 with respect to x, u and v are continuous with respect to time t;
• the information structure of Player i ∈ K, which will be discussed below. The leader (Player 1), who chooses the control u, aims at minimizing the criterion J 1 and the follower (Player 2), who chooses the control v, aims at minimizing the criterion J 2 . We assume that the game is a single stage one, that is the choice of the controls should be done before the game begins at t = 0. It is assumed in this paper that there exists an information bias in the game which induces a hierarchy between the two players. We therefore have a Stackelberg differential game. The follower will rationally react to an observed control u of the leader. The leader is aware of this rational behavior and will use this bias of information to choose his/her control and to minimize his/her own criterion. Definition 2.1. The rational reaction set or best response set of the follower is defined by
Definition 2.2.
A min-min Stackelberg strategy (u * * , v * * ) is defined by the minimization problem vA min-max Stackelberg strategy can be interpreted as the minimization of the leader's criterion whenever the worst choice of the follower's control among the rational reaction set occurs. It can be viewed as a robust or risk-averse property with respect to the choice of the follower, which could be crucial in automatic control for robust control such as H 2 /H ∞ -control (see [37, 59] ).
Remark 2.1. These two definitions coincide whenever T is a single-valued mapping. Considering that T is a single-valued mapping is a widespread assumption in the literature simplifying the arguments. Here we do not assume that and we make a weaker assumption (Assumption 1 in Sec. 3.2) that is related to the criterion J 1 and the set T . Assumption 1 will be discussed in Sec. 3.2. Note moreover that, in the linear-quadratic case (investigated in Sec. 3.4 and more specifically in Sec. 4), T is a singlevalued mapping and hence both definitions min-min and min-max coincide in that case.
The structure of the controls has to be formalized to make precise the induced optimization problems:
• Whenever the controls are only functions of time t, that is u |t = u (t) and • Considering u |t = u(t, x) and v |t = v(t, x), defined for every x ∈ R n , and not only along the trajectory x(t) corresponds to the concept of feedback Stackelberg solution, in the spirit of the dynamic programming approach [10, 47, 48] , even though dynamic programming does not apply rigorously to such a Stackelberg strategy, due to time inconsistency [25] .
As was said above, in this paper we consider closed-loop Stackelberg strategies. Note that, in the linear-quadratic case (see Sec. 3.4), the values of the closed-loop Stackelberg controls and feedback Stackelberg controls coincide along the associated trajectory.
Within the framework of a closed-loop information structure, the evolution law of the game state given by (2.1) is written aṡ
Moreover, the sets U and V can be specified such that, for every couple (u, v) ∈ U × V, the associated trajectory x(·), solution of (2.6), is well defined on T . Throughout the paper, for the sake of clarity, we use the notation u x = ∂u ∂x to denote the Jacobian of u(t, x) with respect to the second variable x. We thus have
ists and u(t, x(t)) as u x (t, x(t)) are continuous in x(t) and piecewise continuous in t ,
and piecewise continuous in t .
The main difficulty in a closed-loop Stackelberg strategy is the presence of the partial derivative ∂u * ∂x in the necessary conditions for the follower.
Different alternatives, surveyed for example in [12] , have been proposed in the literature to overcome the difficulty raised by the presence of the partial derivative ∂u * ∂x in the necessary conditions for the follower. The first approach consists in finding an equivalent team problem leading to a global minimization of the leader's cost and obtaining a particular representation of the leader's control [11] . The second approach consists in determining the follower's rational reaction set and the necessary conditions for the leader optimizing a dynamical problem over an infinite dimensional strategy space subject to dynamical constraints (evolution of the state vector and follower's rational reaction set). In [46] , this problem is handled using a variational method, which however does not lead to all solutions. In this paper, based on the Pontryagin minimum principle, we derive necessary conditions for a min-max and min-min Stackelberg strategies, in the sense discussed formerly. Our study permits to compute the values of the controls u * (t, x(t)) and v * (t, x(t)) along the optimal trajectories. We do not provide an expression of the Stackelberg controls u * (t, x) and v * (t, x) for every x, except in the linear-quadratic case (see Sec. 3.4) where our main result can be made more precise and more explicit. Finally, using the theory of focal points, we provide sufficient conditions for local optimality (which are global in the linear-quadratic case).
Necessary conditions for min-max and min-min Stackelberg strategies
Due to the hierarchy between the two players, necessary conditions are first established for the follower, and then for the leader.
3.1. For the follower. The best response set or rational reaction set T of the follower defined by Definition 2.1 does not depend on the choice of min-max or min-min Stackelberg strategy. The best response set of the follower T u * involved in the definition of Stackelberg strategy (2.4) or (2.5) (implies that, for a fixed control u * , the control v * of the follower solves the following optimization problem.
Necessary conditions for the existence of an optimal solution of Problem 3.1 for the follower are derived in the next proposition, proved in Appendix.
Proposition 3.1. Consider a closed-loop min-max Stackelberg pair of controls
(u * , v * ) (or respectively min-min Stackelberg pair of controls (u * * , v * * )) for system (3.1
), associated with the trajectory x(·), then there exists an absolutely continuous mapping p
2 : [0, t f ] → R n ,
being a non trivial line vector, such that
where H 2 denotes the Hamiltonian of the follower,
All solutions v of Eqs. The set valued mapping T , which is defined by Eqs. (3.2)-(3.4) and satisfies T u ⊆ T u, will be used in the next subsection to derive necessary conditions for the leader, under a weak assumption on T , T and the criterion J 1 , as explained next.
For the leader.
From the leader's point of view, unlike the follower's one, the optimization problems related to min-max and min-min Stackelberg strategies differ. We first consider the min-max Stackelberg strategy and we make the following assumption, needed to derive Proposition 3.2. 
Assumption 1.
Under Assumption 1, we have
This proposition is proved in the Appendix. In the same way, let us now consider the min-min Stackelberg strategy and make the following assumption necessary to derive Proposition 3.3. 
Assumption 2.
Under Assumption 2, we have
Remark 3.2. Assumptions 1 and 2 devoted respectively to min-max and min-min Stackelberg strategies, are weaker than assuming that T is reduced to a singleton and differ only by their sign. It preserves the diversity between these both frameworks. Note thus that Assumption 2 has been already assumed in [46] to solve the min-min Stackelberg strategy.
Remark 3.3. Note that, under standard assumptions such as the convexity of J 2 [35, Chap. 5], or the fact that the set T u * be reduced to a singleton (as in the linear-quadratic case, see Sec. 3.4), or the fact that T u = T u (as assumed in [10, 46] for example), the necessary conditions for the follower are also sufficient (see [35, Chap. 5] ) and Assumptions 1 and 2 are fulfilled. In the linear-quadratic case in particular, Assumptions 1 and 2 are automatically satisfied.
Propositions 3.2 and 3.3 stress out that in the constraints of the leader optimization problem for min-max and min-min Stackelberg strategies, the set T u could be replaced by the set T u, without loss of generality. 
with S continuous with respect to t and C 1 with respect to x and p 2 . These solutions being isolated, the set of all these (local) solutions is discrete. Then, our main results apply for min-max (respectively, for min-min) Stackelberg strategies by selecting among the discrete set of solutions (3.11) the one maximizing (respectively minimizing) the criterion J 1 of the leader. We stress again that, in the linear-quadratic case (see Sec. 3.4), there exists a unique global solution. This allows to obtain the same solution for both min-max and min-min Stackelberg strategies.
The leader, with his top hierarchical position with respect to the follower, can impose the control of the follower. The leader knows the reaction of the follower, i.e., he knows the function S. Then the leader seeks to minimize his own criterion where v is replaced by the function S. Using the notatioñ
the following problem is considered:
under the following two dynamical constraints:
14)
and
Due to the nonclassical term u x , the usual Pontryagin minimum principle (see [35] ) cannot be applied. However, it is possible to adapt its proof and derive a version of the Pontryagin minimum principle adapted to the system (3.14)-(3.15) (see the Appendix). The following proposition is proved in the Appendix. 
Proposition 3.4. If the trajectory x(·) associated with the pair
(u * , v * ) of
closed-loop Stackelberg controls is a solution of the Stackelberg problem, then there exist absolutely continuous mappings
λ 1 , λ 2 : [0, t f ] → R n ,
called costate vectors (written as line vectors by convention), and a scalar
3.3. Degeneration property. Equation (3.17) implies either that λ 2 ≡ 0 or F 22 ≡ 0 (or both) along the interval [0, t f ], where
In the general case, the relation F 22 ≡ 0 is not obvious to analyze, however we will see that, in the linear-quadratic case, this relation does not hold under a weak additional assumption of the Kalman type (see Proposition 3.7 below). In the general nonlinear case, based on the genericity strategies developed in [5, [22] [23] [24] , we conjecture that the relation F 22 = 0 does not hold generically. The strategy would consist in deriving an infinite number of times the latter relation, to infer an infinite number of independent relations, and to use Thom's transversality theorem. However, it is not obvious to turn this fact into a proper theorem and we let this question open in the general nonlinear case. The next proposition, proved in the Appendix, investigates the first case of that alternative, which is, in some sense, the generic one.
Proposition 3.5. Under the additional assumption that the
is invertible, we have
Remark 3.4. The fact that λ 2 ≡ 0 means that the leader does not take into account the rational reaction set of the follower. It is actually not in contradiction with the hierarchical position between the leader and the follower; indeed, in this case the leader does not take into account the reaction of the follower, because he can impose his desired control to the follower.
The leader is omnipotent with respect to the follower. The condition ∂F 22 ∂u invertible formalizes this privileged position of the leader. Proposition 3.5, under a weak assumption, emphasizes the omnipotence of the leader leading to a degeneration of the min-max and min-min Stackelberg strategies. The hierarchical roles of the players seem to disappear. An omnipotent leader is able to impose his/her control to the other player without taking into account the rational reaction set of the follower.
These conditions happen to be more explicit in the linear-quadratic case. In the next paragraph we focus on that case, and analyze more deeply the former necessary conditions. Our analysis finally leads to a more precise result on the Stackelberg controls in the linear-quadratic case.
3.4. Linear-quadratic case. In this section, we focus on the linearquadratic case, due to its widespread presence in the literature [20] , and reformulate and make more explicit our previous results. Consider a linear dynamic constraintẋ
and the quadratic criteria 26) where the matrices Q i , R ij , and K if are symmetric for i, j ∈ K, and Q i ≥ 0, R ii > 0, R 12 > 0, and R 21 invertible. In what follows, denote
3.4.1. Necessary conditions for the follower. The Hamiltonian associated with the follower (dynamic constraint (3.24) and criterion (3.26)) is
Applying the relations (3.2) and (3.3), we obtaiṅ
Since R 22 is invertible by assumption, the optimal control is
3.4.2. Necessary conditions for the leader. In the case of quadratic criteria, we have
32) 
Using the expression of the optimal control of the follower (3.31), the instantaneous leader's criterion can be written as
The necessary conditions (3.16), (3.17), (3.18) , and (3.20) lead to
with the transversality conditions
From (3.36), as discussed in Sec. 3.3, either λ 2 ≡ 0 or
is invertible and by Proposition 3.5, we can deduce that λ 2 ≡ 0. We next prove by contradiction that λ 0 = 0. If λ 0 were equal to 0, then we would infer from (3.37)-(3.39) that λ 1 , like λ 2 is identically equal to zero by Cauchy uniqueness; thus, (λ 1 , λ 2 , λ 0 ) is trivial, and this is a contradiction with the Pontryagin minimum principle. From now on, we normalize the adjoint vector so that λ • = 1. From (3.35), we deduce with the invertibility of R 11 , that
Moreover, Eq. (3.38) becomes, with λ 2 ≡ 0 along the interval [0, t f ],
Assuming that the rank of B 2 is maximal, that is, rank B 2 = m 2 (the number of the components of the control v), this relation yields
If R 12 is invertible, then the control v admits two expressions:
(3.42)
We gather the previous necessary conditions for optimality in the following proposition. 
Remark 3.5. As will be justified below by Proposition 3.7, the case x 0 = 0 leads only to the trivial solution, which has only few interest. Thus in the sequel of the paper, x 0 is always considered non trivial to avoid the trivial optimal trajectory. From (3.36), even if λ 2 ≡ 0, two cases must be yet considered to precise necessary conditions: either 
This means that there exists a unique optimal trajectory, which is trivial.
The proof of Proposition 3.7 (see the Appendix) relies on the following lemma concerning the Kalman condition (also proved in the Appendix).
Lemma 3.1. Assuming that the pair A T , Q 1 and one of the pairs (A, B 1 ) or (A, B 2 ) satisfy the Kalman condition, then the pair (A, B) satisfies also the Kalman condition, where
Remark 3.6. This means that the particular case p 2 B 1 + u T R 21 ≡ 0 can be discarded under weak assumptions on the system. The leader should be able to observe the system (pair (Q 1 , A) observable) and at least one player should be able to control the system ( (A, B 1 ) or (A, B 2 ) controllable). Once again, it is emphasized that the roles of the players are not symmetric.
Case p 2 B 1 +u
T R 21 ≡ 0. Relation (3.48) is equivalent to the following two relations:
Hence along the interval T
(3.52) Equation (3.51) permits to derive an expression of ∂u ∂x , since
with
Constraint (3.50) translates into a constraint on the set of initial points x 0 ∈ R n from which a solution starts.
Lemma 3.2.
The optimal solutions must emanate from initial conditions x 0 lying in a subspace of R n of codimension m 2 (at most).
Note that given a starting point x 0 lying in the subspace of Lemma 3.2, there exists a unique trajectory starting from x 0 , but it is achieved by all controls which satisfy relation (3.51). An optimal trajectory induces several possible ∂u ∂x .
This fact appears in [41] where it is assumed that the initial state is uniformly distributed over the unit sphere and replacing the optimization criterion with its mean value over the initial state.
Remark 3.7.
In the case of an optimization problem without terminal criteria, relation (3.50) does not reduce the set of initial states x 0 associated with optimal trajectories.
We gather all previous results in the following theorem. 
Then the optimal trajectory satisfies the necessary conditions u(t, x(t))
= −R −1 11 B T 1 K 1 (t)x(t), v(t, x(t)) = −R −1 12 B T 2 K 1 (t)x(t), (3.55) wherė x(t) = A − (B 1 R −1 11 B T 1 + B 2 R −1 12 B T 2 )K 1 (t) x(t), x(0) = x 0 ,(3.
56)
where K 1 is the unique solution of the matrix differential equatioṅ
Theorem 3.1 provides rigorous necessary conditions for closed-loop minmax and min-min Stackelberg solutions of generic linear-quadratic games. Up to now, this problem has remained open and was only partially solved in particular cases in [46] . It should be stressed again that the trajectory associated with closed-loop Stackelberg solution is unique, nevertheless it induces several possible u x , which satisfy Eqs. (3.58)-(3.59) and are completely characterized by 3.53. This degree of freedom in the choice of u x , leading to the same trajectory, requires an additional objective, e.g., arguments related to the robustness or the sensitivity of the min-max or min-min Stackelberg solution.
Sufficient conditions
In this section, using elements of focal point theory, we derive sufficient optimality conditions, first for the leader, and then for the follower in the case of linear-quadratic games.
Preliminary comments, focal times.
The optimization problem of the leader is min uĴ1 (u), where
t, x(t))R 11 u(t, x(t))
, the control w is cheap (see [15] for the concept of cheap control), since it only appears in the dynamics of p 2 , and nowhere else (it does also not appear in the cost); then, we rather consider p 2 as a control. Note that this is a particular case of the so-called Goh transformation (see [6, 7, 15, 53] for the definition and properties of the Goh transformation, related to singular trajectories or abnormal extremals). Actually, in what follows we consider ξ = B B 1 u(t, x(t) ),
Remark 4.1. Note that this linear-quadratic problem with controls (u, ξ) is related to the Team optimal approach in [11] . In this reference, the first step in the research of min-max or min-min Stackelberg strategy is to obtain the minimum of the criterion of the leader, by a team cooperation between the leader and the follower. Then the follower control is modified to achieve the minimum of the criterion of the follower.
A necessary condition for the existence of an optimal control of problem (4.2) is
It is equivalent to R 12 ≥ 0, since R 22 is positive definite. When t f is small, R 12 > 0 is a sufficient condition for the existence of an optimal control (see, e.g., [19, 35, 54] ). In the following, it is assumed that R 12 > 0.
Under this assumption, the optimal controls u and ξ are given by
Recall that, in order to characterize focal points (for a definition and properties of focal points we refer the reader to [6, 15, 16] ), we consider the variational system
By definition, the first focal time t c > 0 along the trajectory x(t) associated with the controls (u, ξ) is the first positive time at which there exists a solution (δx, δλ 1 ) satisfying (recall that x(0) = x 0 is fixed)
It is well known that this condition is equivalent to
K(t)
t→tc, t<tc
where K(t) is the solution of the Riccati differential equation
The first focal time t c is a finite escape time for the Riccati differential equation (4.7). Note that K(t) = K 1 (t f − t), where K 1 (t) is defined by (3.57) . Rigorously, since the first focal time is defined by an infimum, its existence must be proved (see the following lemma).
Lemma 4.1 (see [6, 15, 16] The optimization problem for the follower is minĴ 2 , where
The variational system along the trajectory x(·) is
Here, due to the freedom in the choice of w 2 to obtain u x by relation (3.53), we choose u(t, x(t)) affine with respect to x(t), thus ∂ 2 u ∂x 2 = 0. Equation (4.11) takes the form
By definition, the first focal time t c along the trajectory x(t) associated with the control v is the first time at which there exists a solution (δx, δp 2 ) of (4.10)-(4.11) such that δx(0) = 0 and δp 2 (t c ) = δx T (t c )K 2f . For each choice of admissible term u x (that is choice of w 2 ) satisfying relation (3.58), there exists a first focal time t c .
Sufficient conditions for min-max and min-min Stackelberg strategies.
We gather the previous remarks in the following result. ⊥ . This choice of w 2 leads to design the Jacobian u x satisfying (3.53): (3.57) . Denoting x(t, x 0 ) the obtained trajectory, let
(4.14)
Then, for every x 0 ∈ H, there exists a unique optimal solution of the optimization problem (4.8) on [0, t f ] associated with w 2 . The optimal controls (u * , v * ) associated with this unique optimal trajectory satisfy ( Remark 4.4. The sufficient conditions for optimality are developed in the linear-quadratic case, and are global in that case. It is also, by the same argument, possible to express similar sufficient conditions in the general case of nonlinear criteria. However, they are not developed here, because their expressions are more technical and because they lead only to local optimality results (see [6] or [16, Chap. 9 
]).
Remark 4.5. The assumption R 12 > 0 is required to derive Theorem 4.1. This assumption is used in a crucial way in order to derive Lemma 4.1 (more precisely, to derive inequality (A.53)). It is natural to make such an assumption when inspecting the minimization criterionĴ 1 (u, ξ) defined by (4.2): indeed, as explained few lines above (4.2), the problem degenerates into a cheap control problem. In this sense, ξ = B T 2 p T 2 may then be considered as a control, and therefore it is clear that one has to assume that R 12 > 0 in order to ensure nice coercivity properties for the quadratic criterionĴ 1 (u, ξ). [46] . Then the leader takes into account a restriction on the Jacobian of its control. The leader is no more omnipotent. The new criterion of the leader is then
where u j are the m 1 components of the control u, and R j ∈ R n×n , j = 1, . . . , m 1 , are symmetric positive definite matrices.
Nothing changes for the follower. However the necessary conditions for the leader are modified as follows:
The other necessary conditions (3.18) and (3.20) are the same. Equations (4.17) and (4.18) are easily solvable, without considering different cases. In this framework, λ 2 cannot be trivial. As in [46] , we obtain from (4.18) that
. (4.19)
For simplicity, we next assume, as in [46] , that R j = R > 0 for every
Substituting this expression in (4.17), we get
is invertible.
As long as
is invertible, the optimal control is
23) The nonlinear optimization problem becomeṡ
with boundary conditions
Remark 4.8. For R = γ Id, if we let γ tend to +∞, then we recover the necessary conditions for the strategy of Stackelberg with an open-loop information structure. Note that this coincidence is obtained only by taking the limit γ → +∞ without modifying the criterion of the leader.
Remark 4.9. These conditions are necessary conditions. As previously, the theory of focal points leads to sufficient conditions associated with the min-max or min-min Stackelberg strategy with closed-loop information structure including a weight for u x in the criterion of the leader, namely, given x 0 ∈ R n . For t f less than the global focal time of the system, there exists only one trajectory starting from x 0 solution of (4.24)-(4.29) associated with the optimal control (u, u x ) (see (4.23)-(4.20).
Conclusion
In this paper, the min-max and min-min Stackelberg strategies with a closed-loop information structure are studied. The framework is restricted to two-player differential games. Necessary conditions for the existence of a closed-loop min-max and min-min Stackelberg strategies are derived by considering all cases. It is also shown that they may degenerate whenever the leader is omnipotent and can impose his control to the follower. The focal times theory provides sufficient conditions for the optimization problems of the two players. The linear-quadratic case is used to illustrate the obtained necessary and sufficient conditions. Moreover in this linear-quadratic case, the control u(t, x) is obtained for each state x. An extension is proposed to allow an optimal trajectory starting from any initial state by including, in the criterion, the Jacobian of his/her control in the criterion of the leader.
Appendix A. Proofs of theorems Preliminaries. We start with preliminaries essentially borrowed from [6, 15, 35, 54] . First, consider a usual optimal control problem:
where x(t) ∈ R n and u(t) ∈ R m . A usual way to derive the Pontryagin minimum principle for such an optimal control problem is to extend the control system with a new state variable representing the cost, in the following way. Define the extended state z = (x,
, where x 0 (0) = 0, and
Consider the extended control systeṁ
z(t) =f (t, z(t), u(t)). (A.2)
The associated endpoint mapping e z0,t f at time t f is defined by
with z u the trajectory solution of (A.2) associated to the control u, and U is the set of admissible controls. The crucial remark which is at the basis of the proof of the minimum principle is the following: if a trajectory x(·), associated with a control u on [0, t f ] is optimal, then the endpoint mapping e z0,t f is not locally surjective at u, then it follows from an implicit function argument that the first differential of the endpoint mapping at u is not surjective (at least in the case where there is no constraint on the controls). This fact leads to a Lagrange multipliers type equation which finally leads to the well known Pontryagin minimum principle (see [54] for details).
In the present paper we are not dealing with such a classic optimal control problem, however the previous reasoning may be adapted, even though our controls now depend also on x(t), and we first derive a proof of Proposition 3.1.
Proof of Proposition 3.1. Define the extended state
(and the projector q(z) = x), wherex is the instantaneous cost associated with the criterion of the follower such thaṫ
which leads to the dynamic of the extended state z:
It is pointed out that the function t → u * (t, x(t)) is fixed and the control of the follower v(t, x(t)) is the optimization variable. T is the mapping
where z v is the solution of (A.4) associated to v, starting from z 0 , and V is the set of admissible controls.
To compute the Fréchet first derivative, consider a fixed control δv such that v and v + δv belong to V and denote z + δz the trajectory associated with the latter control [35, 54] . An expansion to the first order off leads to
Furthermore, to the first order,
Substituting these Taylor series expansions into relation (A.6), we have, at the first order,
δv.
Using the transition matrix Φ(t) satisfyingΦ(t) = aΦ(t) and Φ(0) = Id (Id denoting the identity matrix), it follows that
If a closed-loop Stackelberg control v * ∈ V of the follower is optimal, then the first derivative of the end-point mapping, de z0,t f (v * ), is not surjective, and hence there exists a line vectorφ ∈ R n+1 ,φ = 0 such that Furthermore, deriving
with respect to t, we obtaiṅ
10) the last equality holds due to relation (A.9). Denoting
, we obtain that p • 2 is a constant scalar. Finally, the initial condition z 0 being fixed and the final condition z(t f ) being free, the standard transversality condition associated with system (A.4) implies that p
We normalize the costate vector so that p
is defined up to a multiplicative scalar. The transversality condition leads to Eq. (3.4) and p 2 satisfies Eq. (3.3). In addition, relation (A.9) could be reformulated into Eq. (3.2) ).
Proof of Proposition 3.2. For each
With Assumption 1, in a neighborhood U * nb of u * ∈ U, we have
Thus, u * defined by (3.6) is also given by (3.7).
Proof of Proposition 3.4. As above, we define the extended state
where x • is the instantaneous cost associated with the criterion of the leader satisfyingẋ
The extended system is subject to the dynamicṡ
where u = u(t, h(Z)) is a function of time t and of the projection h(Z) = x.
The end-point mapping at time t f of system (A.14) with initial state Z 0 is the mapping
where Z u is the solution of (A.14) associated to u, starting from Z 0 . Here
such that the solution Z u (·) of (A.14), associated with u and starting from Z 0 , is well defined on [0, t f ].
Note that, ifF is of class C p , p ≥ 1, then E Z0,t f is also of class C p . To compute the Fréchet first derivative, we proceed as in [35, 54] , consider a fixed control δu on U and note Z + δZ the trajectory associated with the control u + δu. An expansion to the first order ofF leads to
Furthermore, an expansion to the first order of the control u gives
Therefore, at the first order,
Using the transition matrix M defined byṀ (t) = A(t)M (t) and M (0) = Id (Id denoting the identity matrix), it follows that
(A.18) If u is the control of the leader in a closed-loop min-max or min-min Stackelberg solution, then there exists a vectorψ ∈ R 2n+1 ,ψ = 0 such that
Furthermore, relation (A.19) holds for every control δu, and thus
This relation is satisfied for all controls u functions of t and x. In particular it is also satisfied for controls u functions of t only. For such a control, relation (A.21) becomes 
Z(t) =F t, Z(t), u(t, h(Z(t))), u y (t, h(Z(t)))
= 
∂H ∂ψ t, Z(t), u(t, h(Z(t))), u y (t, h(Z(t))) , ψ(t) = −ψ(t) F Z t, Z(t), u(t, h(Z(t))), u y (t, h(Z(t)))

+F u t, Z(t), u(t, h(Z(t))), u y (t, h(Z(t))) u y (t, h(Z(t)))h Z (Z(t)) +F uy t, Z(t), u(t, h(Z(t))), u y (t, h(Z(t))) u yy (t, h(Z(t)))h
where
The tangent manifolds T Z(0) M 0 and T Z(t f ) M 1 are defined by
The transversality conditions can be written as (see [6] or [54, p. 104]) The k-order derivation of (A.42) with respect to time, at time t = t f , gives
The assumptions of Lemma 3.1 are verified. This leads to the controllability of the pair (A, B) , which implies that x(t f ) = 0. Furthermore the autonomous linear system in x, λ 1 and p 2 with end value conditions x(t f ) = λ T 1 (t f ) = p T 2 (t f ) = 0 imposes, by a backward integration of (A.43)
(A.45)
The unique optimal trajectory in this case is the trivial one.
Proof of Lemma 3.2.
Similarly as in the classic linear-quadratic problem, we seek a solution in the form λ T 1 (t) = K 1 (t)x(t). Then, the matrix K 1 (t) ∈ R n×n must satisfẏ The existence of a solution of the optimization problem is ensured in a standard way "a la Riccati" and by the uniqueness of an optimal trajectory. This is justified a posteriori in the following by using the theory of focal times. Using these inequalities and (4.2), we can compute a lower bound of the criterionĴ 1 (u, ξ)
For sufficiently small t f > 0,
, the criterionĴ 1 (u, ξ) is finite, then 0 < t f < t c . 
